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ABSTRACT
As security technologies become more embedded into peo-
ple’s everyday lives, it becomes more challenging for re-
searchers to understand the contexts in which those tech-
nologies are situated. The need to develop research meth-
ods that provide a lens on personal experiences has driven
much recent work in human-computer interaction, but has
so far received little focus in usable security. In this paper we
explore the potential of the micro blogging site Twitter to
provide experience-centered insights into security practices.
Taking the topic of passwords as an example, we collected
tweets with the goal to capture personal narratives of pass-
word use situated in its context. We performed a qualitative
content analysis on the tweets and uncovered: how tweets
contained critique and frustration about existing password
practices and workarounds; how people socially shared and
revoked their passwords as a deliberate act in exploring and
defining their relationships with others; practices of play-
fully bypassing passwords mechanisms and how passwords
are appropriated in portrayals of self. These findings be-
gin to evidence the extent to which passwords increasingly
serve social functions that are more complex than have been
documented in previous research.
1. INTRODUCTION
Nearly twenty years have passed since early calls for us-
able security [40] where security researchers were encour-
aged to lend contemporary research methods from the field
of human-computer interaction (HCI). The HCI methods of
the day were focused upon improving the efficiency of users
in their interactions with digital technology in the work-
place; however, even at that point in time, digital technolo-
gies were already accelerating on a trajectory of becoming
tightly interwoven into people’s everyday lives. Designing
and evaluating digital technologies that will play this role is
challenging, because the success criteria for that technology
is not only related to the efficiency of the interface interac-
tions but must include a broader agenda of understanding
Copyright is held by the author/owner. Permission to make digital or hard
copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted
without fee.
Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS) 2015, July 22–24,
2015, Ottawa, Canada.
how technologies involve people emotionally, intellectually
and sensually [24].
It is challenging to understand and design for these facets
of technology usage as people appropriate technologies dif-
ferently according to their own personal circumstances, past
experiences and anticipations for the future. However, en-
gaging with this challenge and taking an experience-centered
[39] approach to design requires designers to continuously
seek new perspectives on how people live with the technolo-
gies they design [27] and accept that interactions and experi-
ences are unique to the person through their own interpreta-
tions, feelings and value judgments [25]. By trying to see the
world through the eyes of another person and respecting the
different values held by others, the designer is better placed
to generate a rich, contextual understanding of the problem
at hand as well as new design ideas. Recent work has ar-
gued the value of a focus of an experience-centered approach
to usable privacy and security [9], but while some research
is beginning to address this challange [29, 36] there is still
a dearth of methods for eliciting, evoking and developing
descriptions of everyday security experiences.
Social media platforms are used by people to share their
thoughts and opinions with friends, family, colleagues, or
others with similar interests. Communicating online, people
exchange information via ’posts’; an important attribute of
these posts is that they are made in a naturalistic setting
and in the course of daily activities. The content of these
posts is increasingly the focus of analysis for those seeking to
better understand people’s behaviors and opinions, ranging
from understanding political sentiment [2], to tracking the
spread of the flu virus [22]. However, while platforms such
as Twitter —used for everyday conversations, the sharing of
news, and to document daily occurrences [17] —had a user
base of 232 million at the end of 2013 [28], no work has yet
investigated its potential as a resource of everyday security
experiences, nor considered how data of such scope and scale
might enhance our understanding of how people appropriate
security mechanisms into their lives.
To these ends, this paper makes two key contributions
to the study of security experiences: firstly we identify so-
cial media, specifically Twitter, as a resource of naturally
generated reflections on security practices and workarounds
in social settings, and qualitative content analysis (QCA)
as an appropriate method of analysis. Secondly, analyzing
tweets on the topic of the password we identify key qualita-
tive themes and present data that provide new perspectives
on everyday password usage situated within the context and
complexity of everyday life, social relations, and practices.
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2. RELATEDWORK
2.1 Understanding Password Practices
Conventional wisdom on managing passwords securely has
not changed much since early guidelines were published [3].
Such guidelines are typically centred upon changing pass-
words regularly, not sharing passwords with others, not writ-
ing them down, and making them difficult to guess for oth-
ers. Much work has taken place in the usable security com-
munity to understand how desired password behaviors (set
out in guidelines) manifest in practice. Klein [19] showed
that people were likely to choose very short passwords that
were vulnerable to guessing attacks structured by a standard
word dictionary. Sasse et al. [30] conducted a survey in a
workplace and uncovered the challenges people faced to re-
member passwords; particularly those that were infrequently
used. This work also highlighted that the requirements of
securely managing passwords had considerable potential to
conflict with everyday work practices.
Password sharing is a topic that recurs in studies both
in and out of the workplace. Inglesant and Sasse [15] re-
port that shared passwords were a de facto means to access
shared resources in the workplace. Outside of the workplace,
the literature is more sparse. Kaye [18] reports the results
of a survey that describe how passwords were routinely, yet
thoughtfully, shared amongst partners and spouses, friends
and family and even work colleagues. Indeed, one third of
respondents claimed to share their personal email password,
compared to one quarter sharing their Facebook password;
in both cases sharing was predominantly with partners and
close friends. Examples that could be considered more ex-
treme shed light on the how people share passwords to over-
come physical or geographical difficulties. Dunphy et al. [8]
report how older adults would delegate personal identifica-
tion numbers (PINs) to helpers who would visit the ATM
on their behalf. Singh et al. [32] describe occurrences of
password sharing amongst couples but also report how an
entire village would delegate bank credentials to a single per-
son who would travel a considerable distance to the nearest
bank to conduct business on everybody’s behalf.
Each of the presented research studies represent consider-
able investments in time to work together with user groups
’in the wild’ to surface relevant insights. However, while it
may be attractive to dismiss some of the examples as par-
ticularly extreme, the reality is that for the people living
in those contexts, the practices are completely normal and
represent a very personal and experience-centered trade-off
between usability and security.
2.2 Understanding People via Social Media
Piskorski [28] explains that people are attracted to so-
cial media platforms as they offer different ways to inter-
act with others and help fulfill social needs. Twitter is a
micro blogging-based social network site that is arguably
the most popular example of its kind; it grew in popularity
around 2010. The platform offers functionality to connect
to strangers, yet it provides some opportunities for interac-
tivity or more private communication with friends. Morris
et al. [26] describe how Twitter is used to distribute content
such as breaking news, describing the platform not only as a
social network, but also as a news source that people access
to specifically search for a topic of personal or community
interest. Duggan and Smith [7] published a survey report
about social media use by Americans, which showed that
about 18% of all online adults are Twitter users, compared
to the 71% being users of Facebook the largest online social
platform. While Facebook is popular across a range of de-
mographic groups, 31% of Twitter users are drawn from the
age range 18-29 (19% of Twitter users are in the age range
30-49 years; 9% for 50-64 years; 5% for 65+ years) with
a particular presence of urban dwellers, African-Americans
and Hispanics. Moreover, Twitter users are split equal in
gender and 46% of all Twitter users tend to visit the site
daily (29% multiple times per day). Smith and Brenner [33]
further reported on a high correlation between the use of
Twitter and of mobile technology, especially smartphones,
which is generally high among African Americans and His-
panics, and is an increasing trend amongst younger adults.
The challenge to understand peoples’ behaviors and opin-
ions outside of the laboratory context in a resource respect-
ful manner is faced by a multitude of researchers. One ap-
proach that is increasingly popular concerns the analysis of
social media posts as empirical data. For example, Kramer
[20] analyzed posts from Facebook and applied techniques
of quantitative sentiment analysis to explore the measure-
ment of levels of happiness in the user group. Lampos and
Cristianini [22] used a content analysis of tweets to esti-
mate the spread of the H1N1 virus in the UK; their esti-
mates showed a fair agreement with the estimates of cen-
tral government at the time. Golder and Macy [11] found
that social media posts can mirror seasonal behavior fluctu-
ations across different communities. Moreover, social media
(specifically Twitter) has been used in the last few years to
monitor political sentiment and predict election results [2,
33]. While communication and politics researchers have con-
trasting views on the validity of Twitter for these purposes
—mainly due to concerns around the representativeness of
the sample —Twitter has shown itself to be an reasonable
predictor of election results (e.g. as an exit poll) when both
volume-based measures and sentiment analysis are applied
[35].
The analysis of posts on social media platforms has so far
served a variety of purposes in the field of human-computer
interaction. For example, the act of tweeting is increasingly
integrated into large events or even television shows as a
way to encourage audience participation, gather feedback,
or provoke debate. Doughty et al. [5] analyzed tweets pub-
lished during a UK-based television show that focused upon
the Irish traveler community. They discuss how the tweet
contents demonstrated the potential for Twitter to reveal
prejudices held by an audience, but also how the micro blog-
ging might have served to reinforce those prejudices.
3. SOCIALMEDIAANDSECURITYEXPE-
RIENCES
Social media analysis has not yet been considered as a
means to understand everyday experiences of security tech-
nologies. When considering why we might need new meth-
ods to specifically capture naturalistic everyday experiences,
it is important to note the two types of knowledge that re-
searchers may aim to elicit from users through research: ex-
plicit knowledge, and tacit knowledge [39]. Explicit knowl-
edge comprises that which is easy to transmit to another
person e.g. the number of siblings a person may have, or the
number of passwords that a person uses. Much of what we
2
know about the world however is tacit knowledge; knowledge
that is difficult to transfer to another person e.g. how to use
complex equipment (where experience has guided learning),
or reasons for why a system feels secure.
Accessing tacit knowledge typically requires researchers
to apply a mix of methods in their interactions with peo-
ple (e.g. observations, surveys, diaries etc.) to identify and
capture instances of interesting behaviors, and may even in-
clude working together with participants to highlight that
interesting behaviors exist in the first place, but also to un-
derstand why those behaviors come about [38]. Relatively
few methods in usable security go beyond traditional inter-
views and surveys to elicit this tacit knowledge; these classic
methods best serve as tools to capture explicit knowledge
(except where dialog [39] is explicitly supported), as do al-
low respondents to reflect on their own behaviors, however,
within an experimenter defined framework.
The use of social media posts as a lens on everyday se-
curity experiences would immediately present a number of
methodological benefits:
• People are free to use their own vocabulary to describe
their feelings and practices.
• Posts are created in naturalistic contexts and in the
course of everyday activities.
• Security would be positioned as a social and collec-
tive [6] practice rather than a personal and secretive
practice.
• There is a large volume of social media posts to study,
and they are typically short in length.
3.1 Everyday Vocabulary
Despite the common mantra that users are not interested
in security, recent research suggests that, at times, users give
it the utmost care and attention [18]. However, people might
not describe their concerns or understanding in ways that
experts would immediately recognize. As security features
permeate the everyday technologies that people encounter,
security becomes more of a subject of public discourse and
people are able to collectively develop their own ways to ar-
ticulate concerns as security becomes a less guarded topic.
This vocabulary can spread across communities in the form
of colloquial language or even form folk stories [36]. In-
deed, this expert-oriented lexicon around security is likely
to be one of the reasons why it can be challenging to sup-
port people to contribute effectively to conversations around
information security.
3.2 Naturalistic Insights
Social media posts can be created in the course of everyday
living where participants are taking part in neither a lab nor
a field study, which frees the data from biases introduced by
a researcher or by a specific topic under investigation. For
typical people there can be many reasons to create personal
social media profiles to document their everyday lives, how-
ever, one of those reasons is unlikely to be to purely discuss
security or privacy (although this is possible). Consequently,
we can think of social media as a side channel into everyday
life where personal experiences are foregrounded. This ap-
proach can mitigate biases introduced by the researcher that
occur naturally in a face-to-face scenario such as pursuing
personal interests or directing conversations towards active
hypotheses. Of course, alleviating the biases introduced by
a researcher in a face-to-face context does not imply that the
data are not skewed in any other way (see Limitations and
Related Work) or that eliminating all bias is desirable. In-
deed, by focusing upon experiences we are placing personal
biases of users as the core item of enquiry; micro-blogging
sites have been designed to allow fast and concise user inter-
action and are designed to support users’ self-portrayal. As
a result, the affordances of the social media platform have
an effect on people’s interactions and the types of posts they
may make.
3.3 Security as a Collective Practice
Information security behaviors are typically considered at
the level of the individual. Social media platforms encourage
social interactions; so far researchers have studied social me-
dia posts and have succeeded mainly in generating insights
relating to group behavior [2, 33]. While research docu-
menting group security behaviors does exist e.g. [32, 8, 18],
this strand of work is still underexplored and chiefly serves
to provide contrast to the mainstream research agenda fo-
cused upon the individual; evidenced by the observation that
insights from such studies are slow to find their way into
proposed system designs. The existence of security-related
experiences on social media could help redress the balance
and provide opportunities to study diverse online communi-
ties and better understand how security is appropriated in
such groups. A group perspective on a security technologies
could provide opportunities to question how a technology
’should’ be used, and shed new light on the ways in which
security is actually socially practiced and negotiated.[6].
3.4 Big Data of Security Experiences
It is reported that 500 million tweets are posted per day
on Twitter [1]. The sheer volume of social media posts on-
line lends itself to a number of methods of data analysis both
qualitative and quantitative. In this paper we take a quali-
tative approach which reflects our contention that personal
experiences can be complicated and personal, however, other
methods exist which can support the data analysis process or
the filtering down of a large dataset such as sentiment analy-
sis [34]; this is one quantitative method widely used in social
computing and provides one perspective on the overall mood
in the data according to the identification of positive and
negative word combinations. While the social media data is
owned by a private company, the data is openly searchable
which can provide a certain element of transparency in the
sourcing of data and comparisons across online communi-
ties, even at different points in time according to events that
happen in society. Research across a number of disciplines
is pursuing methods to aid exploration of large quantities
of data, but open questions would remain around feeding
insights back into the design of security technologies.
4. STUDY METHOD
Over a period of 26 days in February 2014 we collected
password-related tweets using the Twitter Search API (this
preceded the streaming API which is now widely used). Our
search criteria returned all available tweets containing the
hashtag ’#password’ or the keyword ’password’, in combi-
nation with searches that additionally included specific pro-
nouns e.g. ’I’, ’me’, ’you’, and possessive pronouns e.g. ’my’,
’your’. This was to ensure that tweets were as closely re-
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lated as possible to personal experiences. The search crite-
ria would also return replies to tweets containing that cri-
teria and retweets. During the time period of the study,
we downloaded the most recent 15 ’pages’ of tweets each
hour, using individual timestamps as a check to determine
whether we had downloaded a particular tweet before. Our
focus was on tweets with unique content, so after one pass to
filter out retweets, our dataset comprised just over 500,000
tweets (µ = 19222 per day, σ = 3623). This relatively large
dataset indicates a common occurrence of password-related
discussion within daily communications on Twitter.
4.1 Data Analysis
The approach of our research was qualitative. We con-
ducted a Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA) [21] on a sam-
ple of 1000 tweets that were randomly selected from the
dataset, and were roughly balanced across each day of data
collection. We chose QCA over alternative approaches such
as Grounded Theory [10], since our research is exploratory in
nature, with a focus on latent expressions of personal expe-
riences (inductive) and led by existing theories and previous
research on peoples’ password practices (deductive).
For our QCA, three members of the research team in-
dependently familiarized themselves with the data to iden-
tify and systematically search for (reccurring) themes in the
tweets. Identified themes were then coded, first individu-
ally and then recoded following conversations between the
researchers, and then synthesized to higher-level categories.
The comparing of content codes and discussing them with
each other formed an essential part in this process, since,
for a large number of the tweets, and influenced by our in-
dividual perspectives, multiple interpretations and thematic
groupings seemed possible. Partly, this was due to a lack
of context information that was available in relation to each
tweet, which in itself provided little insights about the sit-
uation that may have motivated the post, or the intentions
of the person sending the message. For some messages it
was also not always clear if they were intended to reflect
a serious statement or an expression of sarcasm or a joke,
leading us to be particularly cautious in their interpretation.
After one pass of our QCA we disregarded 302 tweets from
further inquiry, as they were either not written in English
(124 tweets); presented advertisement or spam messages (52
tweets); were unreadable (e.g. cryptic composition of num-
bers or characters; 29 tweets); or presented posts that were
ambiguous (97 tweets) to the extent that the researchers
could not reach agreement about their content. The remain-
ing 698 tweets that were conclusive and agreed on by all
three coders were analyzed with regard to the insights they
provide for understanding peoples’ password practices and
concerns. Although we could have included more tweets, we
noticed towards the end of our analysis that the themes that
we had identified reached saturation, whereby any additional
tweets only provided more examples of a similar themes.
Our findings present the themes that evolved through this
mode of analysis.
4.2 Limitations
Before the presentation of our findings, it is worth clarify-
ing some limitations of the data that will be presented. From
an analysis perspective, we disregarded tweets that were not
written in English. At the time of our study, The Twitter
Search API allowed the retrieval of at most a 1% of all the
data matching some specified criteria. After the threshold
of 1% has been reached only sampled data is available to
the API calls of the user, with the methods of sampling un-
known (although premium search options did exist). Such
restrictions may be removed in the newer Streaming API. As
with any online community there are discrepancies in which
members make the biggest contributions; on Twitter, some
estimates suggest that 40% of users do not tweet at all, and
90% have less than 10 tweets [14]. Secondly, as with any
qualitative data, the data we present should not be scru-
tinized for its generalizability. The data provides insights
confined to the group of people it was collected from and
the reader should consider the transferability of the insights
with caution. As such, the reader should scrutinize the data
for its trustworthiness [12], which is composed of credibility,
transferability, dependability, and confirmability.
5. FINDINGS
Our QCA revealed three high level themes. Firstly, people
commonly tweeted about specific practical difficulties that
they encountered in the set-up or retrieval of passwords;
how they experienced such difficulties, as well as a range
of individual workarounds they developed to manage these;
all of which highlight classic usability and security issues.
Secondly, tweets contained insights into some of the com-
plexities that surround peoples’ everyday uses of passwords
within their social life. In this regard, users expressed how
the request, receipt and sharing of passwords with others as-
sisted in exploring and defining a person’s relationship with
others. Thirdly, some tweets served to portray the person-
ality of a person in a certain light, where the password was
used to reinforce certain desired aspects of a person’s char-
acter. Thus, the final theme presents how people made use
of their understanding of, and practices around, their use of
passwords to support a specific display of identity.
The particular passwords that people appeared to discuss
were mostly online accounts such as social media sites, video-
streaming services, and so forth. This might indicate that
Twitter is an adequate platform for understanding the expe-
riences of these types of (more social) passwords, or it might
be our search criteria were inadequate for collecting insights
on other types of password. In the following sections we pro-
vide example tweets that illustrate our three themes. How
these initial observations can be interpreted is then devel-
oped further in the discussion section of the paper.
5.1 Password Practices and Workarounds
One third of the tweets that we analyzed (n = 237, 34%)
presented descriptive accounts of the difficulties that peo-
ple encountered in generating, remembering and recovering
their passwords. Even though this could have been expected
considering the search criteria that we used to collect the
tweets, it is particularly interesting that these accounts were
also followed by feelings of anxiety and frustration about a
potential loss of access to one’s account, as well as some of
their personal strategies for managing these.
5.1.1 Frustration about System Demands for Secure
Practices
In a number of tweets (n = 87, 12%) users expressed,
often in a sarcastic or joking manner, their opinion about
current requirements posed upon them in the creation of se-
cure passwords for their accounts. They expressed critique
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about demands to generate passwords that are very long, in-
clude upper or lower case characters, and a number, and to
also have to change and to re-enter these frequently. Users
tweeted for example: ”Sorry your password must contain a
capital letter, two numbers, a symbol, and a inspiring mes-
sage #BumpDat”; “I thought it’ll be a password not a pass-
speech”; “It’s always a test of my intelligence when I change
my password”; or“Why must I type in my Apple ID password
EVERY TIME I download an app?!? #Annoying”.
Such system-enforced security demands are often experi-
enced as a chore and can challenge users’ ability to remem-
ber their passwords. Thus, we frequently identified posts
in which people expressed their frustration about forgotten
passwords. Expressions of anger or melancholy in this regard
included: “Omg I forgot my password to my fone!!!!!RS”; or
“I wish I could change my Wi-Fi name, but apparently I
don’t have the correct password to do so. #sadface”. Users
also, albeit less often, tweeted about being relieved when
they had regained access to an account: “OMG I forgot you
had my password. Wheeeww I thought I was going crazy
[username]”.
In some cases people also commented that losing or forget-
ting their passwords implied a loss in access to their online
accounts as illustrated by these tweets: “[username] I forgot
my password 4 years ago, soooooo, I don’t use that account
anymore, Sherlock”; or “[username] I got a new twitter be-
cause I couldn’t retrieve the password from my other one”.
While most online systems offer functionality for password
retrieval, for some users this did not appear to be a possi-
ble solution or straight-forward process. Expressing frustra-
tion about difficulties to recover forgotten credentials, people
tweeted for example: “why is there no way for me to recover
my skype name and password? gawddddd”. Moreover, at
times, available recovering options did not reflect the au-
thentication problem that the user was facing: “#Thatawk-
wardMoment when you can’t remember your username, and
the only option is “Forgot Password”. #Why”.
As a result, we identified a number of tweets in which users
reported to have created a new account. However, specifi-
cally with regard to Twitter this comes at the cost of the
person needing to reconstruct the list of people they were
following and to re-contact their list of followers. Where the
creation of a new account appeared to be the only possible
course of action, this did not only feel frustrating to the ac-
count owner, but was also greeted by perplexion by others:
“Why do people make a new Twitter account when they for-
get their password instead of clicking the “Forgot Password
button? #comeonpeople”.
5.1.2 Password Management: Personal Practices &
Workarounds
Difficulties related to the remembering of passwords de-
scribed above led to descriptions of people abandoning exist-
ing accounts. Many users further admitted to have had the
same password for many (if not all) of their accounts, under-
mining some of the security demands posed upon them: “I
Got The Same Password For Everythang!”. Others openly
described their approaches to recovering their passwords, ex-
plaining how they keep for example a record of these in their
email account: “[username] I can never remember the pass-
word LOL [laugh out loud]. I do have it saved in my mail
though”.
In addition to descriptions of such workarounds, people
tweeted about how their remembering of certain passwords,
especially online passwords, was complicated and addressed
through the practices they had develop around their every-
day password use (n = 150, 15%). Some described difficul-
ties remembering their passwords due to routine, embod-
ied typing mechanics: “I barely remember my password, my
fingers are just used to typing it so much”. Again others
explained how especially the automatized login processes
on mobile devices that stores users’ credentials can cause
authentication problems when the user deletes certain mo-
bile apps that hold their saved account details, or if they
lose or change their devices. Describing these memorabil-
ity problems users tweeted for example: “I dont even know
my password on twitter so if i ever lose my phone im f[?]d”;
“[username] lol I know I forgot my twitter password so I can
only tweet from one device where the password is saved”; or
“[username] got anotha phone n dnt got my password to the
account”.
To gain general advice and support by others about how
to recover one’s passwords or manage hacked accounts, we
found that users tweeted for example IT queries regarding
Twitter to the official Twitter account: “twitter won’t let
me login on my iPod. It used to but now it tells me “in-
correct password or username” I’ve checked everything”; or
contacted the official support account: “Support please fix
the recaptcha thing it won’t let me log in. im only able to log
in if i reset my password”. Moreover, users also frequently
posted advice to each other about password management
and privacy settings, and they warned one another about
security breaches in relation to their accounts being hacked,
providing advice how they could regain control. The follow-
ing tweets illustrate this: “[username] just go to your set-
tings, go to password, change it, and then review who’s on
your account and you can revoke their access”; or “hi Mar,
just to let u know that you may need to change your twit-
ter password as i keep getting spam msgs from your account.
Mark xx”.
5.2 Social Practices around Passwords
A large proportion of the tweets that we analyzed (n =
306, 44%), described a wide range of social practices that
evolved around the giving, receiving and resetting of a per-
son’s password. In the following we present examples of
tweets that outline how the sharing of passwords has been
a deliberate act in enabling access to certain resource for a
specific individual or group of people; and in defining a rela-
tionship as close, intimate and trusting, or as doubtful and
disappointing. Furthermore, the findings show how trying
to guess the (online) password of a person in one’s social net-
work can become a playful social challenge rather than being
perceived as a security threat; and how people who broad-
cast their passwords online do so under consideration as to
how the target recipients would gain access to their devices
or (online) accounts without compromising their overall se-
curity. All of these examples contribute to an experiential
account of how passwords are embedded and have become
of immense importance in peoples’ daily and social lives,
demonstrating how their role undoubtedly exceeds securing
access to personal data.
5.2.1 Sharing Access to Resources with Social Net-
work
We identified a number of tweets in our data set (n = 56,
5
8%) of users describing how they were sharing passwords
as a way to manage and distribute access to resources such
as WiFi or a person’s Netflix account. For example, users
tweeted to request or offer the password to certain online
platforms for sharing the benefits and/or costs of a partic-
ular service with members of their social network: “Getting
my Netflix account back tomorrow..who wanna go half n get
this password??”; or “If anyone wants to share with me their
Netflix username and password I’ll give you a prize (will be
food)”. Passwords were also shared with members of a spe-
cific social group to organize access to materials by these
people. For example: “just dm [direct message] me if you
want the password to this account, ANYONE from the phan-
dom can use it:)”; or “[username] can we recreate 6th grade
and make a mom jean patrol club, only those with the pass-
word are allowed in”.
5.2.2 Defining Relationships as Close and Intimate
Exploiting conventional assumptions that passwords are
something to be kept private, several tweets (n = 52, 7%)
described how people shared their passwords as a way of
defining their relationship with friends, family members, or
romantic partners. These tweets portrayed, at times play-
fully, how the giving, receiving, exchanging and possessing
of access to someone’s passwords reflected a certain close-
ness and intimacy between, and knowledge of, each other.
For example, the following tweets indicate how, quite liter-
ally, the sharing and knowledge of a person’s password with
another person defined their relationship for example as ‘ro-
mantic’ or as ‘friends’: “I cant call you my girl till you know
my email password?”; or “[username] We’re not friends until
I have your wi-fi password”.
Similarly, if a person was considered to be a romantic
partner or friend, the sharing of their passwords appeared
to be a social practice that was expected of them: “If you
don’t give me your wifi password then we can’t be friends
anymore”. However, this social obligation did not find ac-
ceptance by all, as is indicated in this tweet: “idc [I don’t
care] if we date what you need the password to all my stuff
for”. Moreover, if the relationship had taken a hit or peo-
ple fell out with each other, passwords were revoked: “[user-
name] I forgot the password on one and the other got blocked
by [username] who I had an argument with :D xxx”. In the
context of exchanging passwords between people, we also
found posts that reflected an adherence to the social norm
of reciprocity, which was especially apparent in the following
tweet: “[username]... she has my password too... its equal”.
Most striking however were expressions of closeness whereby
the knowing of a person’s password was equated with know-
ing the person: “If you don’t know my password than you
don’t know me”. Equally, if a person had intimate knowl-
edge of the other, they were better positioned to guess their
passwords, as became apparent in the following two tweets:
“I’ll give ya’ll a hint. It’s an 8 character password and the
second letter is A”; or“my phone password is my crushes last
name lol”. This last tweet further indicates that choosing the
names of people one is close to as passwords presents a fre-
quent practice and one that can also cause difficulties, when
the social bond is broken off, as this tweet demonstrates:
“And your name is still my password so I’m reminded of
that shit everyday”.
5.2.3 Giving and Revoking Trust to Others
In this context of password sharing, a number of tweets (n
= 45, 6%) linked giving someone access to personal accounts
or WiFi networks to an awarding of trust and the expecta-
tion that the recipient would treat the password appropri-
ately (however socially defined in the different instances).
Reminding the recipient of the responsibility that they had
been given through the password, one user tweeted for ex-
ample: “Kaitlin’s the only one that knows my password now.
Sooo, I know it’s you that just tweeted that Kaitlin”.
The relationship between password sharing and trust, how-
ever, became most apparent in tweets where users openly
expressed their disappointment and frustration about oth-
ers ‘abusing’ their online accounts by deleting, changing or
adding information. The following tweets illustrate this:
“Never give your password to sum1 else i learned from that
cause they will delete your things”; or “i’m so paranoid i’m
never giving anyone my password ever from now on oh my
god”. In response to the violation of trust that the password
recipient had been given, Twitter users described to have
revoked other peoples’ access (e.g. by resetting their pass-
words): “I’m not giving you the new wifi password next time
you come home.”; or “Gonna have to change my password
so Casandra can’t see these messages”.
5.2.4 Playful Social Hacking
There have also been Twitter tweets describing peoples
frustration and concerns about their accounts being struck
by system hacking or phishing attacks (n = 36 as part of the
password difficulties theme above). For example, a common
observation were tweets to deceive users to disclose confi-
dential information, such as: “#retweet If you type your
password on twitter, it shows up as stars! :D ******”. How-
ever, we also identified various tweets (n = 87, 12%) where
protecting one’s password from known others (usually so-
cial connections/friends of the person) became an invitation
and playful challenge for some to try ‘guess’, ‘hack’ or ‘rape’
their account. The following tweets exemplify such intents:
“What Breanna thinks my twitter password is?”; “If I had
Josh’s password I’d totally be raping his account right now.
#StrangeUrges”; or “[username] Jon has my twitter pass-
word and conversates with himself”.
To those who succeeded in guessing other peoples’ pass-
words and hacking into their online accounts, this felt like
an achievement, but we also found complaint tweets of those
people who feel victim to such an attack: “Ayeee, Boy Who
hacked My Twitter I Will give Youu 24 Hours to Change My
Damn name Back or My password Will Be changed”.
5.2.5 Broadcasting Passwords: Physically and So-
cially Secured
Occasionally (n = 66, 9%), users also publicly posted their
own or other peoples’ passwords and pin codes on Twitter.
However, those tweets may not have presented an immedi-
ate security threat, as they often required additional access
to the device to which they would provide access. For exam-
ple: “Joes iPod password is 1337”; or “[username] Alright,
I’m gonna leave my phone in here w/ you guys. My pass-
word’s 0209 if you need it”. Moreover, in tweets where uses
requested a certain password of others, they often suggested
a different channel for receiving it (e.g. send as a text mes-
sage rather than a tweet). The following tweets illustrate
this: “[username] text me the password for raleys wifi”; and
“[username] whats the WiFi password. Dm [direct message]
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it lol”. In other words, only certain parts of an authentica-
tion process were publicly revealed that either required the
person to be in reach of a particular password-protected de-
vice to complete access; to have sufficient ‘knowledge’ about
that person (e.g. their home address to be able to make
use of their WiFi credentials); or to qualify (e.g. as a ‘close’
friend) to be send a text message with the remaining details.
5.3 Use of Passwords and their Practices in
Self-Portrayals
As a platform that invites the open sharing of personal
opinions and thoughts, Twitter enables people not only to
share information, but to communicate something about
their self. Thus, we frequently observed how people used
tweets and their understanding and (mis)uses of passwords
to portray a particular image of their self (n = 155, 22%).
5.3.1 Raising Authenticity of One’s Online Profile
A large proportion of those posts (textitn = 80, 11%)
included messages of users admitting that they had for-
gotten their password or had trouble entering it correctly.
About trying to remember their passwords and describing
their difficulties to log into their accounts, users tweeted for
example: “Ok 12 year old self....what would you have made
your password”; “I was typing the wrong password into Face-
book #FacePalm”; or “Me: ‘types in password, Password
Doesn’t Work’ OMG I’M HACKED.... oh wait... never
mind, CAPS LOCK WAS ON..’ ”; and yet another user
tweeted: “[username] yeah but still trying to figure my pass-
word to my heathmax12 account. I swear I should be a natu-
ral blonde”. While these tweets say very little about practical
problems in relation to how people manage their passwords,
they present expressions of malpractice with regard to how
the person was handling certain difficulties. Such self-por-
trayals of inadequate behaviors however can raise the per-
ceived authenticity of their online profile.
5.3.2 Insights into One’s Security Attitudes and Prac-
tices
In contrast to tweets in which people present insufficien-
cies in how they manage their passwords, we also found a
small proportion of tweets (n = 11, 2%) in which users pre-
sented themselves as concerned about protecting their pass-
words and keen to keep their accounts and devices secure.
Most tweets in this regard included complaints about shoul-
der surfing attacks, and peoples’ personal attitudes towards
adding or regularly changing passwords. Examples include:
“I hate when people stare at the keyboard while I’m typing my
password”; “I should really put a password on my phone.”;
and “Treat your password like your toothbrush. Don’t let
anybody else use it, and get a new one every six months”.
5.3.3 Presenting Oneself as Faithful, Cool or Funny
Some of the tweets (n = 27, 4%) with regard to peoples’
portrayals of their identity further link to the previously de-
scribed theme on ‘trust’, in that users related to their prac-
tices of password sharing as a means to describe themselves
as faithful and to have nothing to hide. Users tweeted for
example: “I have nothing to hide he can have my password
to everything including my phone. #faithful!”; or “?If I had
a boyfriend, he’d know my password to my phone. I have
nothing at all to hide”.
In general, peoples’ tweets would present a snapshot into
their personality, presenting them for example as stubborn,
unlucky, cool, and most commonly, as funny (n = 37, 5%).
For example: “I do have a life outside of Twitter, but I can’t
remember the password for it”. Furthermore, some Twitter
users specifically exploited the particular affordances and
qualities of (online) passwords, their character composition
and length, or the assumptions that people commonly have
of them as something that should be kept private and se-
cured from access by others in the telling of jokes. One user
for instance tweeted the following: “I was choosing a pass-
word for my new computer last night, I tried LiverpoolFC
but apparently it was too weak”; and another one posted:
“What’s Forest Gump’s password on Facebook? 1forest1.
aha get it.”.
6. DISCUSSION
Over the past twenty years, digital technology and its as-
sociated security mechanisms have diffused into almost all
aspects of people’s lives which has considerable implications
for how security technologies must be designed and studied
[9]. After identifying social media as a potential resource of
security-related experiences, we analyzed posts on the the
example of the password due to its status as a security tech-
nology that has resisted a concerted research effort to find
usable and secure alternatives [13]. The research we have
conducted raises a number of discussion points around how
studying personal experiences on social media sites can con-
tribute to a better understanding of the design challenges
facing security technologies;
6.1 Passwords as a Social Currency
Our main findings were around how passwords being ap-
propriated as a social currency, where people were often
thinking carefully about passwords and how the maximum
value (both pragmatically and socially) could be derived
from that password. We saw how the inherent value of
passwords made them an item fit to be protected, shared
or sought after in a social circle. The need to protect pass-
words was demonstrated in no small part through users’
expressions of frustration at password loss (e.g. ”#sadface”,
”#Annoying”), and relief at rediscovery (e.g. ”Wheeeww I
thought I was going crazy”). The sharing of a password with
another person can be a powerful act in defining a relation-
ship (e.g. as trusting, as being close). Social expressions of
trust were defined by the sharing of the password that regu-
lated access to certain accounts or services, and were ended
through the revoking and resetting of that password if a vi-
olation of this trust relationship occurred. This form of ‘ac-
cess control’ is enabled through the affordances of passwords
as they currently are. Twitter was often used to broadcast
or discuss any violation of a trust relationship, and various
memes that circulate in tweets shed light on how a person
might like to respond in such circumstances.
Conventional wisdom considers that security is a secondary
concern for users [30, 37]. This is typically true, however re-
cent work has shown how passwords can be foregrounded
in relationships where the sharing of credentials can serve
functional purposes due to e.g. disability [8] or geographic
isolation [32]. The trend of social hacking is particularly in-
teresting, and is likely to be facilitated due to the increased
user awareness of the limitations of password choice, but also
the large number of opportunities that exist today to com-
promise passwords in some way. These activities are also less
7
likely to be interpreted as being deviant due to the lack of
technical sophistication required to achieve such compromise
e.g. displays are increasingly portable and high resolution,
which permits shoulder surfing; devices can even be sur-
reptitiously accessed shortly after a user has authenticated
to a device; or people may forget to logout while checking
emails on the device of a friend. Exploiting these situations
can simultaneously provide friendly feedback that some se-
curity practices leave something to be desired, but creates
a learning feedback of how accounts can be compromised
in the social domain if that password are not appropriately
managed.
Security researchers often design systems that must im-
pede opportunities for users to perform certain actions. Tra-
ditional conceptions of passwords involved the assumption
that they were strictly personal and not to be shared [23].
Our findings reinforce that technology designers should be
mindful of the ways that people appropriate security mech-
anisms when designing systems that may aim to control be-
haviors; a goal that may contribute to the reduction rather
than the increase of security.
6.2 Using Twitter for Understanding Security
Experiences
The tweets we collected provided us with a snapshot into
a wide range of very practical difficulties that people en-
counter in their daily routines around the use, set-up and
maintenance of their passwords as well as a glimpse of their
emotional responses. While in this paper we have focused
upon tweets that concerned the use of passwords, it is likely
that other areas of security and privacy are also discussed
prominently on Twitter and could be studied in a similar
way. The most suitable issues are likely to be those that are
relatively common in everyday life, yet are ever-changing in
how they manifest; for example: phishing [16], identity theft,
email account hijacking [31], and computer viruses. Each of
these areas has social engineering and deceit at its core, and
studying tweets can likely provide a useful window to under-
stand how users make sense of these attacks while they are
underway, and how people might recover from them. Future
research can verify whether this is the case.
An alternative approach to social media analysis could fo-
cus upon timely events in society that have privacy and secu-
rity implications. Twitter was a particular hub of discussion
during the recent heartbleed [4] controversy. Heartbleed was
the name given to a bug discovered in the OpenSSL library
that underpins much secure communication on the Inter-
net. One piece of advice that emerged from this controversy
was the need for users to change all of their passwords. At
that time people turned to Twitter and used the hashtag
#heartbleed extensively to complain about the possibility
of changing passwords, and to seek more information from
the crowd about the problem. This could lead to analyses
of how attitudes to security and privacy change after signif-
icant events, or simply change naturally over time.
Recent work focused on security stories [29] and folk mod-
els [36] reinforce the need for a sustained focus on how peo-
ple make sense of security technologies; it is possible that
social media analysis can complement that research agenda
and provide an accessible resource of stories for designers
wishing to gather insights for technology design or simply
understand existing behaviors better.
6.3 Challenges of using Twitter as a Research
Method
Although tweets are restricted to only 140 characters in
length and therefore require users to keep their statements
brief, our analysis has shown how even short textual ac-
counts provided insights into the practices and manifest ex-
periences that people have with regard to passwords. Tweets
however are limited in the extent to which they offer contex-
tual background. Greater attention to capturing ’retweets’
and ’replies’ could alleviate this problem, but this issue mainly
arises from the general absence of rich social cues online
that are inherent to face-to-face rather than online medi-
ated communication; this presented a challenge at times for
the researchers to make sense of the tweets, some of which
therefore had to be excluded from the qualitative analysis.
However, as intended for our present study, a manifest
analysis of tweets provided us with a sense of the many
pervasive and openly communicated (albeit often ignored in
design and policy within the field) relational, social and per-
sonal factors that are at play and apparent in peoples’ expe-
riences of passwords. We regard this outcome as a first step,
on which to build more in-depth and contextually richer fu-
ture research. In this regard, Twitter itself may even become
a useful vehicle to help identify potential research partici-
pants that have demonstrated through their public tweets
certain interests or difficulties in a specific domain. More-
over, brief interviews could even be conducted via Twitter
itself. Examples of this have been seen already from politi-
cians (#askboris is a hashtag used by the Mayor of London
to elicit questions from Londoners).
7. CONCLUSION
particularly where unusable and insecure passwords pro-
vide elements of social value. As security and privacy tech-
nologies increasingly penetrate most aspects of our lives,
there is a need to develop research methods that provide
a window into the ways that people appropriate security
technologies into their everyday lives. It is particularly im-
portant to question the ways that security experts expect
their technologies to be used, and contribute to the design of
new, more experience-centred security mechanisms. In this
paper we explored the use of social media as a window into
everyday security practices. To do this we collected a large
dataset of tweets on or related to #passwords. Our quanti-
tative analysis suggests that Twitter is a platform for active
discussion around password practices. Our findings shed
light on contemporary password practices, and suggests that
today, passwords can be considered a social currency that
people seek to protect, share and obtain from others. These
results have implications for our collective understanding of
how people integrate passwords into their lives, and suggest
Twitter as a platform where other learnings around security
and privacy practices could be focused. Future work can
consider how content from tweets can be source of design
inspiration and feed into a process of experience-centred se-
curity and privacy design.
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